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News :: Civil Liberties & Human Rights : Corporations : Police & Thieves : Politics & Elections |
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UnSmart Access Card |
Current rating: 0 |
by via EFA
(No verified email address) |
12 Aug 2006
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EFA is deeply concerned by the planned rollout of a so-called Access Card smart card linked to a centralised database containing identification, and other, information about almost every adult Australian and Australian residents. The proposal is flawed because it produces a "honeypot effect" |
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EFA is deeply concerned by the planned rollout of a so-called Access Card smart card linked to a centralised database containing identification, and other, information about almost every adult Australian and Australian residents.
The proposal is flawed because it produces a "honeypot effect" - a highly attractive and richly rewarding single target for criminals engaged in identity theft. EFA rejects the notion that the planned card is not an ID Card and recommends that Australians reject the so-called Access Card and related centralised database for substantially the same reasons as the Australia Card was rejected.
The government should go back to the drawing board and design system/s to resolve the system failures within the Department of Human Services instead of turning everyone into an identity card subject linked to a centralised national identity database.
http://efa.org.au/Publish/efasubm-dhs-accesscard-2006.html
Executive Summary
EFA is deeply concerned by the planned rollout of a so-called Access Card smart card linked to a centralised database containing identification, and other, information about almost every adult Australian and Australian residents.
EFA is highly concerned by the government's failure to provide adequate and clear information about the card and associated systems to enable informed public consideration and debate.
Although the KPMG 'business case' document was eventually made publicly available, it is of great concern that it has been heavily censored by the government, resulting in a document that asserts, but does not demonstrate, that a business case exists. It is of further concern that information concerning the technological architecture of the planned system has also been deleted.
The government's refusal to make available the Privacy Impact Assessment, that was based on the same model as the KPMG document, suggests that it would have revealed that the proposed system entails a high level of risk to individuals' security and privacy.
On the basis of information made available to date, EFA recommends that Australians reject the so-called Access Card and related centralised database for substantially the same reasons as the Australia Card was rejected.
EFA is not opposed, in principle, to the issue of smartcards by government agencies. Our position on use of smartcards depends on the particular model, after taking into consideration a range of matters including whether or not the model is appropriately adapted to serve a legitimate and justified purpose. The currently planned Access Card system does not pass this test.
EFA rejects the notion that the planned card is not an ID Card. On the basis of information made available to date, it is clear that the primary purpose of the card is to prove one's identity. All indications are that the card will also be, or be extremely likely to become, a "national identity card".
The Access Card system poses the same risk of increased identity fraud as a national identity card because it involves centralising all personal information on one database and issuing a single form of identification.
The proposal is flawed because it produces a "honeypot effect" - a highly attractive and richly rewarding single target for criminals engaged in identity theft.
EFA believes that, consistent with fundamental privacy principles, personal information should only be accessed and used for purposes directly related to the purpose for which the subject individual provided the information. Accordingly, law enforcement agencies should have no access except for the purpose of investigation of offences directly related to use of a card, that is, fraudulent use of a card and fraudulently obtaining benefits.
EFA is adamantly opposed to the introduction of an effectively compulsory government issued card with inbuilt capacity for function creep.
EFA considers that benefits of the Access Card to consumers have not been identified, particularly the 5.5 million consumers who are Medicare-only clients.
EFA submits that the Government has not discharged the onus of proving that there will be an overwhelming public benefit in the form of a substantial reduction in fraud to justify private rights being eroded.
EFA is concerned that the use of a photograph on the proposed card will facilitate its use as proof of identity in situations where there is no means of electronically ensuring that that card is not a fake.
The government has failed to prove its case that substantial welfare fraud will be defeated by the introduction of the card, and some of the claimed benefits in this area cannot be sustained.
The KPMG report failed to consider the option of separate cards for health services and welfare services, which in EFA's view poses far less risk to privacy and security.
EFA does not support mandatory cards. People should still have the right to choose to provide other methods of identification.
EFA opposes the plan to collect and store biometric information, on the grounds that the technology is not accurate and the need to store facial templates and photographs in a government database unjustifiably increases security and privacy risks.
The existing Privacy Act is totally inadequate for dealing with the privacy risks and issues raised by the planned Access Card system.
EFA is of the view that members of the public should have a choice about whether or not they wish to have a photograph on the card, and a digitized copy of that photograph stored centrally.
The government needs to provide detailed technical information about the operation of the chip, and PIN access capabilities available to various officials and government agencies, before any judgement can be made about likely risks to security and privacy arising from the use of a chip.
EFA considers that the the public has cause for concern about the number of public officials who would have access to the information on centralised databases.
http://efa.org.au/Publish/efasubm-dhs-accesscard-2006.html
efa.org.au/Publish/efasubm-dhs-accesscard-2006.html |
This work is in the public domain |
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UK/ So much for the security of biometric ID |
by Sam
(No verified email address) |
Current rating: 0
12 Aug 2006
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The Home Office said yesterday that the UK biometric passport was one of the most secure in the world and while it might be possible to copy the chip data it was not possible to modify or manipulate any of the data. Last week the House of Commons' science and technology committee called on the government to reconsider the technology behind biometric ID schemed.
http://adelaide.indymedia.org/newswire/display_any/18820 |
